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6 Bernard Mandeville’s Skeptical Political Philosophy  




Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), one of the most famous and controversial 
pamphleteers, satirists, and thinkers of his time, was seriously opposed by most of his 
contemporaries, including George Berkeley, George Bluet, and Francis Hutcheson, 
and only posthumously recognized as a remarkable political and moral philosopher 
by, among others, David Hume and Adam Smith.1 After a period of relative oblivion 
generally corresponding to the nineteenth century, some noteworthy scholars such as 
Arthur Lovejoy and Frederick Kaye wrote important articles on him, generating a 
Mandeville revival, especially since the 1920’s.2 The critical edition of The Fable of 
the Bees edited by Kaye and first published in 1924 remains a landmark of the initial 
phase of this revival.3 In the second half of the twentieth century Mandeville’s work 
and theories became the focus of special attention from economists and sociologists 
who proposed him as a forerunner of conceptions only developed much later.4 
                                                 
1 For a concise and well-informed account of Mandeville’s reception, with updated 
bibliography, see M. Simonazzi, Le Favole della Filosofia. Saggio su Bernard Mandeville 
(Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2008), 19-28. 
2 See Simonazzi, Le Favole, 23 (who mentions Karl Marx’s interest in Mandeville as an 
exception); see also F. B. Kaye, “Introduction”, in B. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or 
Private Vices, Publick Benefits ed. F. B. Kaye (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), LXVIII-
CXIII. Other exceptions include Leslie Stephens. 
3 B. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F. B. Kaye. 
4 Nevertheless, the first book entirely devoted to Mandeville published since the eighteenth 




 At present, most scholars accept that late Renaissance and early modern 
philosophers like Montaigne and Charron, as well as the French moralists of the 
seventeenth century, including the “erudite libertines”5 and the “divines” attached to 
Port-Royal(like Pascal and Nicole), and figures related to the Dutch Enlightenment, 
such as Spinoza and Pierre Bayle, exerted some kind of influence over Mandeville.6 
We can thus find among this group of influences in the background of his thought a 
considerable number of philosophers related to the early modern skeptical tradition. 
Early on, two years after the publication in 1723 of the much enlarged and successful 
third edition of The Fable of the Bees, Bluet stressed Mandeville’s links to the ancient 
Pyrrhonians as well as to Montaigne and French thinkers influenced by them: “From 
this Pyrrho, Scepticks were called Pyrrhonians, or Pyrrhonists; and from hence that 
treatise of Sextus Empiricus […] had its name; in one part of which he endeavors to 
overturn the Certainty of Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice, by collecting a great 
many monstrous Opinions and Customs of People contrary to the common ones. 
From hence, or rather from Montaigne […], who has borrowed it from hence, has our 
Author again borrowed what he has given us to the same Purpose, and in the Pursuit 
of the same laudable End”.7 Bluet here clearly declares that Mandeville belongs to the 
skeptical tradition, at least regarding ethical issues. For him, this tradition, conferring 
an overwhelming importance on the notion of custom and obfuscating the differences 
                                                 
5 The famous expression coined by the French scholar René Pintard [cite his book by title and 
publisher and year] in the 1940’s and since then almost consecrated.  
6 See, especially, J. Lafond, L’Homme et son image; morales et littérature de Montaigne à 
Mandeville (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1996). 
7 G. Bluet, An Enquiry whether a General Practice of Virtue tends to the Wealth or Poverty, 
Benefit or Disadvantage of a People (1725), excerpted in J. Martin Stafford, ed., Private 
Vices, Publick Benefits? The Contemporary Reception of Bernard Mandeville (Solihull: 
Ismeron, 1997), 298. 
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between values, leads to a radical moral relativism. In spite of its biased nature and its 
oversimplifications, this testimony has the merit of showing a contemporary author 
correctly identifying an important part of Mandeville’s “borrowings” and seeing them 
as tied to a specific philosophical tradition.  
Two centuries later, Kaye explicitly called Mandeville a Pyrrhonist, though 
what he meant by this designation does not necessarily coincide with what the 
majority of scholars now understand as such.8He emphasized the link between 
Mandeville’s anti-rationalism and a similar element in the skeptical tradition and 
asserted that “[…] the Sceptics were among the intellectual grandparents of 
Mandeville”.9 More recently, other commentators have related Mandeville either 
directly or indirectly (especially through his kinship with the foremost undeniably 
skeptical philosophers like Pierre Bayle, for instance) to skepticism. Notwithstanding 
this, there still seems to be no consensus about the exact nature of the relation of his 
thought to skepticism. In the present chapter I am trying to clarify this relation, 
focusing on some crucial elements of skepticism that permeate his philosophy in 
general, and his moral and political philosophy in particular. 
 Before entering into the core of my subject, I shall present a few preliminary 
remarks on the hypothesis that there was a scission between two kinds of skepticism 
precipitated by the Cartesian attack on traditional skepticism. In spite of its 
heterogeneity and its historical discontinuity since antiquity, some common traits can 
be used to identify a skeptical philosophical tradition. Among them are (1) that it is a 
philosophy that uses certain kinds of argumentation, (2) that it claims an attitude of 
searching for truth, (3) that it stresses antitheses and antilogies and (4) that it 
                                                 
8 Kaye, “Introduction”, lxi-lxii, lxxvii-lxxxvii, lxxix, cxxxii. 
9 Kaye, “Introduction”, lxxix, note 1. 
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possesses practical aims, seeking a sort of wisdom of which the main element is 
ataraxia. Traditional skepticism thus seems not only livable but propitious to wise 
living. 
What we may claim to be the most relevant branch of the early modern 
skeptical tradition in moral and political philosophy arguably derives from the 
reinvention of Pyrrhonism carried out by Montaigne.10 The Cartesian skeptical 
tradition inaugurated what Anglophone philosophers commonly call modern 
skepticism, basically concerning epistemological and strictly theoretical issues. In 
fact, we may consider Descartes’s approach to skepticism as aimed at dissociating the 
skeptical posture from any practical standpoint, turning it into an unlivable challenge 
both to common sense and to the findings and theories of mainstream philosophy. 
When he created his version of skepticism, based upon an instrumental reduction of 
skepsis to universal doubt, capable of becoming hyperbolic, he did not conceive it as a 
philosophical attitude but as a problem that carried along with itself its own 
overcoming. Such a conception of skepsis as a purely hypothetical and absurd stance 
cannot be properly understood except as originating in the context of a refusal of any 
previous kind of skepticism. Descartes can thus be considered to have really belonged 
to an ancient tradition parallel to skepticism: the anti-skeptical tradition.11 As a 
consequence of this way of fabricating a version of skepticism that allowed him to 
deal with doubt and incertitude by eradicating them completely by rational means, 
                                                 
10 See, especially, Rui B. Romão, A Apologia na Balança. A Reinvenção do Pirronismo na 
Apologia de Raimundo Sabunde de Michel de Montaigne (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 2007). 
11 See, especially, Rui B. Romão, Caminhos Caminhos da Dúvida – cepticismo, 
protomodernidade e política (Lisboa: Vendaval, 2010). What I call the anti-skeptical tradition 
should not be simply taken as dogmatism in general. Instead, it is a tradition developed 
around a core of arguments used by the adversaries of skepticism and perfected as well as 
updated to face the evolution of the skeptical positions.  
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Descartes (eventually provoked the aforementioned splitting in the early modern 
skeptical tradition between two kinds of skepticism, which often crossed paths with 
each other: one was the theoretical skepticism conceived in the molds fashioned by 
Descartes and the other one was the livable and moderate one.  
Thus, the early modern thinkers who continued to consider the skeptical 
posture compatible with everyday life and common sense focused primarily upon 
political and moral issues and, generally speaking, avoided classifying themselves as 
skeptics. They felt free to accept Descartes’s claims against theoretical nihilistic 
doubt, while characterizing this doubt as a preposterous position not seriously adopted 
by any philosopher. Most of them did not eschew dealing with epistemological and 
other theoretical problems but they always dealt with them from a point of view 
related to a moderate form of skepticism.12 Before Descartes, one could find those 
two types of skepticism joined together, in several versions, as a livable and 
somewhat coherent albeit unorthodox philosophy.13 Jonathan Barnes and Myles 
Burnyeat sustained in celebrated articles a different view, claiming a separation, since 
antiquity, between two kinds of Pyrrhonian skepticism, a rustic Pyrrhonism and an 
urbane Pyrrhonism. For them, Montaigne is a typical representative of the latter 
subspecies of Pyrrhonism in the sixteenth century.14 This artificial distinction, based 
upon a somewhat free interpretation of observations made by Galen, a thinker who 
                                                 
12 The expression “mitigated skepticism” is only conceivable after Descartes, referring to 
these skeptical attitudes. 
13 There was indeed before Descartes a kind of theoretical skepticism, in spite of being not 
extreme, for it was conceived as a sort of philosophy guiding life and not made up as an 
untenable position only imagined from an antagonistic standpoint. 
14 Cf. J. Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological 
Society N. S. 28, 1982, 1-29; M. Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in his Place and Time”, in R.H. 
Popkin and C. B. Schmidt, eds., Scepticism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment 
(Wiesbaden: Olms, 19xx), 13-43. 
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was an adversary both of the Pyrrhonist school of philosophy and of the empirical 
school of medicine, is one that only became perfectly conceivable after Descartes. 
Barnes and Burnyeat also seem to misunderstand Montaigne’s reinvention of ancient 
Pyrrhonism. They, indeed, tend to present it as a forerunner in many aspects of the 
conception of skepticism imposed by Descartes.15 
The two most important arguments of the adversaries of ancient skepticism 
were the apraxia and the self-refutation claims, both of them also held against many 
other schools of philosophy. The first type of argument asserts the impossibility of 
living strictly according to the tenets of the professed philosophy. The other kind 
refutes a specific philosophy as self-contradictory. One can easily see that anti-
skeptics, in using these two arguments or others derived from them, followed a 
strategy of reductio ad absurdum of the position the skeptics put forward. The 
Pyrrhonists have always replied to these two objections. In fact, all skeptical 
traditions may be envisaged trying to find a way out of the reach of the attacks of their 
adversaries.16 And curiously, the ancient skeptics, as well as late Renaissance figures 
like Montaigne, Charron, or Sanches, conceived of skepticism as a therapeutical 
philosophy and used against their opponents some form of those two same objections. 
Nonetheless, the adversaries of several sorts of skepticism systematically have kept 
using variants of these two arguments throughout the ages since antiquity until now. 
For instance, contemporary philosophers like Jules Vuillemin and Martha Nussbaum 
recur to them when criticizing ancient pyrrhonism.17 Descartes, with his instrumental 
                                                 
15 See Romão, Caminhos Caminhos da Dúvida, passim. 
16 See Romão, A Apologia na Balança, passim. 
17 J. Vuillemin, “Une morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme?”, Philosophie 7, 1985, 
21-51; M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 313-315. 
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version of skepsis, implicitly merges these two kinds of argument, adding to it a new 
nihilistic dimension.  
This reading of ours can be somehow conciliated with Richard Popkin’s 
brilliant account of Descartes’s struggle with skepticism, in spite of involving a slight 
revision of certain elements of it. Popkin emphasized that the French philosopher 
“saw that only by admitting the full and total impact of complete Pyrrhonism, could 
one be prepared”18 to overcome the crise pyrrhonienne of his time.19 Putting the stress 
on Descartes as part of a tradition of philosophy antagonistic to skepticism from the 
start, as I am here doing, carries as a consequence that he could not really admit a 
“complete Pyrrhonism”,20 but, instead of it, only a distorted one associated with his 
invented hyperbolic doubt. The anti-skeptics always took Pyrrhonism as having to be 
overcome by an exaggeration of their main elements, such as epoche, metriopatheia, 
isostheneia and arrepsia. Cartesian skepticism, as we have above suggested, seems to 
stem from this anti-skeptical tradition. Descartes’s innovation resides essentially in 
conflating arguments used as leading to epoche and in exaggerating them to the 
extreme point of transforming it into a nihilistic stance, which could be employed 
against itself as part of a methodical procedure designed to provide absolute 
certainties upon which a dogmatic building of philosophy and science could be 
erected. Thus, in a way, he tried to take advantage of the Pyrrhonian use of 
                                                 
18 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism. From Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 142. 
19 The notion itself of crise pyrrhonienne, independently from its historical justification, 
should be taken cum grano salis, for it derives from a anti-skeptical conception, according to 
which pyrrhonism should never be envisaged but as a crisis that has to be overcome. 




peritrope.21 This maneuver was eventually self-defeating, as Popkin demonstrated in 
the chapter of The History of Skepticism titled “Descartes, sceptique malgré lui”.22 
Nevertheless, Descartes’s way of perceiving and trying to defeat skepticism from an 
anti-skeptical trend was effective in influencing the later skeptical tradition, obliging 
it to transform itself. An aspect of that transformation consisted in the aforementioned 
splitting of skepticism; another is that skeptical philosophers afterwards had to accept 
some Cartesian claims.23 
                                                 
21 The peritrope is an ancient Greek term that signifies the very same kind of argument used 
by anti-skeptical philosophers when accusing their skeptical adversaries of self-refutation 
whenever they present their philosophical attitude. I have been upholding for some years now 
a theory according to which ancient Skeptics of all tendencies developed in varied forms and 
degrees a kind of thinking I call peritropical thinking, involving simultaneously debating 
techniques and a sort of intellectual ascesis grounded on a complex process that has as its 
centerpiece the exploration of what can be construed as a perverse effect device (cf. Romão, 
A Apologia na Balança, 200-202, 485-492). A crucial point of this theory is precisely that 
better than any other element what explains the continuity of the skeptical tradition is the 
assimilation of self-contradiction as part of the dynamics of skepticism. Montaigne perfected 
peritropical thinking, giving it a larger scope than that conferred on it by the ancient skeptics. 
In the “Apologie de Raimond Sebond”, the openly philosophical chapter of the Essais, and in 
many ways its center, the structure, as I have analyzed elsewhere, follows a progression that 
reveals a characteristic conceptual figure of skeptical thought: what I called the peritropical 
metamorphosis. Its presence in Montaigne’s Essais (in general, and not only in the Apologie) 
is more striking and more complex than its previous presence in any other skeptical writing. 
22 Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 43. 
23 Until recently (perhaps 15 or 20 years ago), most philosophers and historians of philosophy 
have studied preferentially the theoretical branch of early modern skepticism as such. Even 
Richard Popkin and his first disciples, such as Charles B. Schmitt or Craig Brush, did not 
greatly (at least at the beginning of their research) counter that traditional tendency. They 
took ethical issues into due consideration, but they seemed to perhaps overplay the purely 
theoretical interpretation. The pioneer work of John Christian Laursen, The Politics of 
Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant (Leiden: Brill, 1992) directed our 
attention to the ethical and political aspects. See Laursen, The Politicfs of Skepticism, where 
Mandeville is said to be at “the roots of a number of Hume’s ideas” (p. 174). 
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In Mandeville’s philosophy two families of thought related to ancient 
skepticism converge. One, as mentioned above, corresponds to the early modern 
currents of thought that stemmed from the reinvention of Pyrrhonism by Montaigne 
and other thinkers who followed his trail, independently from being directly or 
indirectly influenced by him. We can precisely name among them two philosophers 
whose reading recognizably marked Mandeville’s thought: La Rochefoucauld and 
Pierre Bayle. But one should not ignore Montaigne himself as having exerted an 
important and direct influence on Mandeville.  
The other family of skeptical thought to which Bernard Mandeville belongs is 
the medical one.24The specific medical outlook that he endorsed, which he himself 
described as akin to that of the sect of the “Empiricks”, is striking in Mandeville’s 
moral and political theory.25 
 The crisscrossings of skepticism and medicine have been so frequent 
throughout history since the inception of philosophical skepticism in Ancient Greece 
till now that they cannot but be considered important. Mandeville outstandingly 
illustrates in the early modern age this relation between skepticism and medicine, of 
which the most remarkable example in antiquity is none other than the philosopher 
                                                 
24 Discontinuity characterizes the history of skepticism both in antiquity and in the 
Renaissance and early modern age. But we can still refer to it (and to the ties between ancient 
skepticism and its renewal) as a tradition, albeit varied and many-sided. We hardly can hardly 
say the same about what I have called the family of medical skeptical thought. Though tied to 
the skeptical tradition, it does not seem to constitute a tradition. The members of this “family” 
produced extremely personal and idiosyncratic versions of skepticism. They include neo-
Galenists and anti-Galenists. The most outstanding members of it in the late Renaissance and 
early modern period are, perhaps, Francisco Sanches, Robert Burton, and Mandeville, to 
whom we could add the Spanish thinker Martín Martínez, studied by J. C. Laursen, “Martin 
Martínez. 
25 Mandeville, A Treatise, 48-50; 2nd edition, 1730, 56-58. 
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and doctor to whom we owe the most complete account of ancient Pyrrhonism, 
Sextus Empiricus, a leader of the school of the Sceptics or Pyrrhonists in the second 
century A.D., and also a physician related to the empirical school of medicine. In 
what we can classify as Mandeville’s most ambitious and important work besides The 
Fable of the Bees, titled A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions 
[…],26 he calls the character that admittedly represents his own views Phylopirio, a 
direct reference to his empiricism: “In these Dialogues I have done the same as 
Seneca did in his Octavia, and brought my self upon the Stage; with this difference, 
That he kept his own Name, and I changed mine for that of Philopirio, a Lover of 
Experience, which I shall always profess to be”.27 In this book he amply shows his 
profound knowledge of the history of medicine, his engrained anti-rationalism, and 
his distrust of speculative theories such as hypotheses made up to plausibly explain 
the symptoms of a distemper and not to examine its real causes,28 as opposed to 
knowledge by “Use, Practice and Experience”.29 
 Scholars generally recognize the strong influence of Cartesianism in 
Mandeville’s medical thought, although they add that the impact of this influence 
                                                 
26 The complete title of the first edition of this treatise in three dialogues is: A Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions, Vulgarly call’d the Hypo in Men and the Vapours in 
Women; In which the Symptoms, Causes and Cure of those Diseases are set forth after a 
Method intirely new. The whole interpreted, with Instructive Discourses on the Real Art of 
Physick itself, And Entertaining Remarks on the Modern Practice of Physicians and 
Apothecaries: Very useful to all, that the Misfortune to stand in need of either (London: 
David Leach, 1711). The title of the 2nd edition is: A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and 
Hysterick Diseases. In Three Dialogues (London: J. Tonson, 1730). 
27 Mandeville, A Treatise, 1711, xi. 
28 Cf. Mandeville, A Treatise, 105-106. See, also, e.g., 139-140. 
29 Mandeville, A Treatise, 68. 
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tended to weaken from his first known dissertation to his latest writings.30 One 
instance of this concerns the Dutch physician’s different ways of expressing his 
endorsement of the first two truths of Descartes’s metaphysics in the 1711 edition of 
A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions […] and in the 1730 
enlarged and corrected edition of it under the title of A Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases in Three Dialogues.31 Mauro Simonazzi 
acutely highlights the alterations between the 1711 and 1730 texts in the passages 
referring to that endorsement.32 Mandeville seems to accept the Cogito and the 
consequences immediately drawn from it by Descartes as metaphysical principles but 
just because they enable us to have necessary certitude upon which we may cautiously 
ground our own observations derived from experience. On the other hand, he also 
often insists on the imperfection of our scientific knowledge and on “the greater use 
of observation than reasoning in Physicks”.33 
Most likely Mandeville’s medical training (like that of so many skeptics), 
associated with his experience as a citizen involved in political affairs in Rotterdam,34 
also contributed to the shaping of the pessimistic anthropological conceptions he 
developed. For the Dutch author, human nature is flawed and imperfect. On his 
account, man cannot be considered naturally sociable. Human will and human reason 
are deemed incapable of achieving what we want, mere chance being far more potent 
than both of them. Indeed, in his moral and political writings Mandeville intertwines 
anthropological pessimism with moderate anti-rationalism just as he did concerning 
                                                 
30 Cf., e.g., M. Simonazzi, Le Favole, 36ss; R. Donati, Le Ragioni di un pessimista: 
Mandeville nella cultura dei Lumi (Firenze: Edizioni ETS), 2011, 86-87. 
31 Cf. Mandeville, A Treatise, 1st ed., 124-125; 2nd ed., 154-155. 
32See M. Simonazzi, Le Favole, 121. 
33 See, e.g., Mandeville, A Treatise, 32, 37, 47, 51. 
34 See Simonazzi, Le Favole, 33-48. 
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medical issues. According to his views reason, though subject to the superior force of 
the passions, does play a role of some importance as such in guiding human behavior.  
The core of Mandevillian philosophy seems to be essentially ambiguous and 
ambivalent and for that reason particularly open to varied and new readings.35 His 
contemporaries, such as Hutcheson, already highlighted this characteristic. This can 
be understood as very aptly prolonging the early modern skeptical tradition and 
Pyrrhonian procedures of opposing notions, theories, opinions, facts, and points of 
view.36 
Another trait characterizing the early modern skeptical tradition in moral and 
political philosophy that we find in Mandeville has to do with literary form. Even 
when they do not expressly follow Montaigne’s sophisticated and quite difficult to 
imitate example, most authors linked to that tradition tend to write in a fashion 
compatible with an unorthodox, open-ended, and unsystematic doctrine. Though 
Mandeville’s relatively coherent and compact philosophy presents some systematic 
features, we can hardly call it a system comparable to Hobbes’s, Locke’s, Spinoza’s, 
or Leibniz’s. It is true that he more than once uses the term “system” to refer to his 
doctrine, but I take that he rather does it by analogy with the philosophies he opposes 
and that he simply means by that term a cogent philosophical whole centered on one 
or two principles and not a really an organic set of coordinated theories. Anyhow, he 
adopts for the exposition of his thoughts forms clearly preferred by skeptical 
philosophers: small relatively digressive essays, commentaries, and dialogues, even 
when he calls a collection of them a treatise. We can include among those forms his 
verses constituting the original Grumbling Hive. The open-ended character of the 
                                                 
35 The classic study of Mandeville’s ambivalence still remains Hector Monro’s The 
Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville. 
36 [supply note] 
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ever-expanding Fable of the Bees, built on that initial poem, augmented from edition 
to edition like Montaigne’s Essais or Bayle’s Dictionnaire, forms a clear example of 
the skeptical inconclusiveness related to zetesis and to some particular 
epistemological doctrines. If in some places, such as, for instance, “Part Two” of the 
last edition of The Fable of the Bees, he occasionally adopts a less skeptical tone, 
even there, the frequent humorous touches, the judicious use of irony, and a quite 
ingenious way of using dialogue devices prevent the work from showing a dogmatic 
style. 
Although, as we have seen above, some of Mandeville’s contemporaries 
highlighted the kinship of his thought with Montaigne’s, and many present-day 
scholars confer importance to the relation between the two authors, it seems to me 
that even their accounts underestimate too much that relation. The very subtitle of the 
Fable of the Bees is based upon a correlation of private and public, vice and virtue, 
which bears some resemblance to remarks in the Essays. Mandeville could not 
perhaps make central to his philosophy the distinction between self-liking and self-
love without having studied Montaigne’s passages on philautia, on self-knowledge, 
and on the self-preservation instinct in men and animals.  
We have also to remark that some important features of Montaigne’s 
Pyrrhonism can be found in Mandeville’s philosophy. We may list, besides those 
already mentioned, the following ones among others: the combination of a pessimistic 
anti-anthropocentric Weltanschauung with moderate anti-rationalistic conceptions and 
arguments; an unorthodox form of political conservatism; a mitigated epistemological 
skepticism; diffidence towards unattainable ideals such as those of stoicism or some 
Christian or other religious ascetics (in both philosophers we find expressions of the 
refusal of self-denial); a quite crucial role imparted to passions as springs of human 
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behavior; a curious blend of pragmatic realism and rigorous moralism; the constant 
use of paradoxes; the valorization of contingency; some kind of attenuated naturalism; 
the observation of the intertwining of good and evil in almost every human action; 
and enormous attention to perverse effects. 
These traits, which show themselves as striking affinities between both 
authors, are far more important than signs of mere influence. They reveal that each of 
these two authors, developing an original and innovative philosophy, works out his 
ideas within a common framework that envelops them, that of the skeptical moral and 
political philosophical tradition. 
 Most early modern skeptical authors in the wake of Montaigne share the 
consideration that passions subdue reason and will and that they fundamentally 
govern human action and conduct. Mandeville, exploring similar views, develops a 
rather sophisticated theory of passions founded on the valorization of the self.37 
Mandeville also emphasizes that his viewpoint is descriptive rather than normative. 
 Joining together self-examination with the study of the passions and of human 
behavior, Mandeville conceives the former as a kind of therapeutic procedure 
possessing some similarities with the identical role played by self-knowledge in 
Montaigne’s neo-Pyrrhonian philosophy or in the philosophy of other skeptical 
thinkers of the seventeenth century like La Mothe Le Vayer or La Rochefoucauld. For 
Mandeville self-study constitutes the background against which his analysis of human 
nature and his discussion of the interplay of vice and virtue are set. Without duly 
                                                 
37 The following passage taken from the “Introduction” of the 1732 edition of The Fable of 
the Bees shows perfectly how Mandeville sees man as completely subject to passions: “>…@ I 
believe Man (besides Skin, Flesh, Bones &c. that are obvious to the Eye) to be a compound of 
various Passions, that all of them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him by 
turns, whether he will or no”, Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 39. 
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observed self-examination, which could almost seem an end in itself for the pleasure 
it gives, a man falls prey completely to the empire of the passions and to the power of 
social games of dissimulation. So Mandeville’s valorization of the individual has two 
complementary traits: the free individual, having to be considered as such, becomes 
the most important asset of a free society; men, as they are unwillingly driven by 
passions, must recognize their role and understand their functioning as springs of 
action and guides to conduct in order to overcome their power. 
 The valorization of contingency, along with expressions of anti-rationalism, 
form an essential part of what we could call the pattern of early modern skepticism in 
relation to moral and political philosophical issues. Renato Lessa has explored the 
idea that the “Sceptics established a form of thinking about sovereignty as grounded 
on accidents, traditions and beliefs”.38 This idea and the related notion of “operators 
of circumstance, circumscription and finitude” as characteristic of skeptical 
philosophers are inspired by St. Anselm’s ontological argument and Bodin’s 
conception of sovereignty as developed by the late Portuguese philosopher Fernando 
Gil.39 A belief in “limits and circumscription” replaces the Anselmian and Bodinian 
belief in the unbound.40 I do not fully endorse this interpretation, despite its fecundity 
and the brilliance with which Lessa defends it. It seems to me that the undeniable 
importance conferred by the early modern skeptical tradition in moral and political 
philosophy upon contingency and the role played by circumstances is better construed 
as corresponding to a rejection of belief in finitude. 
                                                 
38 R. Lessa, “The Philosophical Form of Scepticism in Politics”, in 
http://blog.estudoshumeanos.com/the-philosophical-form-of-scepticism-in-politics/, 2008, 3. 
39 See F. Gil, La Conviction (Paris: Flammarion, 2002). 
40 Cf. Gil, La Conviction, xx. 
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 An important issue in the interpretation of Mandeville’s thought concerns his 
alleged foreshadowing of modern liberalism capitalism. According to a quite common 
view he defended some form of spontaneously ordered free market. The famous 
subtitle of the Fable of the Bees, “Private Vices, Public Virtues”, forms an appropriate 
summary of his basic notion that if people pursue their own self-interest (which he 
calls “vices”) a sort of harmonious equilibrium producing benefits for society as a 
whole will eventually turn up as an unexpected result (due to more or less 
complicated chance mechanisms). The most important point here seems to consist in 
the circumstance that the uncoordinated single efforts pursued by individuals pursuing 
their own interests and following their own “vicious” inclinations are paradoxically 
beneficial to the whole. And analogously, according to Mandeville, the coordination 
of those very efforts made willingly in order to achieve a common good is far less 
efficient than that later called “spontaneous order”. This view seems to imply that a 
planned large-scale human intervention is doomed to fail due to chance and to the 
interplay of factors that cannot be controlled by human reason. But that does not mean 
that spontaneity magically begets order, either. 
We see here at work a clearly paradoxical effect. It seems rather unlikely that 
Mandeville would in truth dream of straightforwardly sustaining any economic and 
social system like modern capitalistic ones. In the first place, there is not a single 
known form of modern capitalism that really renounces some kind of rational order 
and deliberate interference with what the ancients called the whims of Fortune and the 
Christians called the mysterious designs of divine Providence. In the second place, 
there has never been any government that really endorsed the kind of realism claimed 
by Mandeville. Moreover, no historical known system officially sustains the 
objectives ascribed by Mandeville to his “grumbling hive”. To the objection that 
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forms of government that are really guided by such a set of values have prevailed 
throughout history though people in power hypocritically proclaimed other public 
objectives, while in reality pursuing those aims, one may reply that if that is true it 
does not only apply to liberal systems but also (albeit in perhaps a somewhat more 
recondite way) to other sorts of systems, including socialist ones. The point is that if 
we base our reading of society entirely upon the assumption of hypocrisy or 
dissimulation, we are at a loss because we will lack an adequate criterion to 
distinguish dissimulated statements from sincere ones. 
That does not mean however that we have to put aside interpretations of 
Mandeville’s economic and political thought such as the famous one sustained by 
Hayek in 1951 (which was followed by many others in its wake) somehow claiming 
the Dutch physician and philosopher as a forerunner of liberal economics.41 Those 
interpretations have legitimacy as long as they limit themselves to admitting that they 
are expressing a conception of Mandeville that foreshadows future conceptions that 
he could not have conceived because they are based upon realities that had not yet 
come completely to form in his own time. I would like to emphasize that those 
interpretations are only partially true, disclosing just one among many other 
contradictory aspects of Mandeville’s philosophy. As Keynes himself (among others) 
pointed out, Mandeville can also be seen as a forerunner of interventionist theories 
like his [footnote]. 
 Independently of the particular kinds of influence exerted by some thinkers on 
others, one can find in some authors more or less strong affinities of thinking. Thus, 
to find in author traces of his partaking of peritropical thought or at least elements 
                                                 
41 Cf. F. A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
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that connect him with it does not mean that they are the product of direct influence. I 
believe Mandeville to be such a case. He certainly read Montaigne’s Essais and seems 
to have held them in the highest esteem, as we have above seen. However, one cannot 
infer from that circumstance the exact nature and extent of the influence he received 
from the French philosopher. We may suggest that the sum of the elements and 
features authors share with each other may suffice to consider them somewhat akin. 
In addition to the other elements I have referred to above, the one to which I would 
like to call your attention consists precisely of a variant of a basic element of 
peritropical thinking. This is the use Mandeville makes of perverse effects as a 
ground for a theoretical construction trying to explain complex structures and 
institutions. 
The central paradox of Mandeville’s masterpiece The Fable of the Bees in any 
of its editions is epitomized in the subtitle of the work: Private Vices, Public Benefits. 
A first hint of this famous formula appears also as a subtitle qualifying the original 
poem (published for the first time in 1706, and reprinted in all editions published 
during the life of the author): The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest. In this 
case, two sorts of individuals are contrasted: the knavish ones and the honest ones. 
The Author puts here the stress on the passage from one condition to the other 
through the past participle of the verb “turn”. An operation of metamorphosis makes a 
bridge between the two opposed qualities, one seen as a point of departure, the other 
envisaged as the arrival point. Mandeville thus gives relevance to the process of 
change itself. Interestingly enough, he observes the alteration as unilateral and not as 
reciprocal: while knavish individuals become honest, honest people do not become 
knaves. And the contrast alluded to in the subtitle has two faces, so to speak. The first 
one, which performs only a circumstantial function, is that the Author shows in the 
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poem the bees engaging in knavish conduct and behaving honestly. The second one, 
the most impressive and important one, is that individuals acting as rogues may form 
a strong and wealthy collective, thus becoming elements of a sound society and 
consequently honest as long as they are taken as parts of a whole.  
The poem itself explores the intertwining of this famous Mandevillian thesis, 
expressed as a paradox, with its also paradoxical counterpart: a hive stocked with 
corrupt and vicious bees was prosperous and powerful; once the hive, because of a 
divine intervention, became free of fraud and the bees acquired virtuous habits, it lost 
its prosperity and power. According to the first part of the paradox, when the insects 
followed their vices (or, as we normally translate Mandeville’s use of that term, self-
interest) and behaved knavishly, business flourished and thrived, instead of decaying. 
As Mandeville says:  
 
Thus every Part was full of Vice,  
Yet the whole Mass a Paradise;42 
 
In spite of this flourishing, hypocritical bees, simulating love for virtue, display 
discontent: 
 
>…@all the Rogues cry’d brazenly, 
Good Gods, had we but Honesty! 43 
 
                                                 
42 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 24. 
43 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 27. 
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Mandeville’s depiction in the fable of the hive turned honest after Jove 
answered prayers asking for a complete moral reform has to our modern ears clear 
dystopian overtones. In fact, the author in the often-quoted verses of the conclusion of 
the poem openly declares that the wish to entirely banish from society the vices that 
constitute an integral part of it and that may contribute to its prosperity is a rationalist 
utopian desire: 
 
>…@ Fools only strive  
To make a great an honest Hive. 
T’enjoy the World’s Conveniencies, 
Be famed in War, yet live in Ease 
Without great Vices, is a vain 
Eutopia seated in the Brain. 
Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live 
Whilst we the Benefits receive.44 
 
Note that he does not say that the mentioned vices will always entail beneficial 
consequences for the societies, but that we have to endure them and be contented with 
their role in society as far as they turn into benefits. 
I have thus far spoken of the first presentation of his paradox by Mandeville in 
1705. I must here insist that though the editions of The Fable of Bees (of which the 
most important are those from 1714, 1723, and 1729) are much bulkier than the 
original one, containing the addition of long comments and essays, and even in the 
                                                 
44 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 24. 
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case of the last edition published during the life of the Author, an entirely new second 
part, they actually reprint the poem as it was initially published. 
The readings Friedrich Hayek made of Mandeville’s theorizing on social 
sciences issues since the 1940’s constitute a landmark in the modern appreciation of 
the thought of the author of The Fable of he Bees, having much contributed to the 
revaluation of it. Hayek’s famous “Lecture on a master mind” of 1966 is his last word 
synthesis on the subject. There we can read that the poem “gives yet little indication 
of his [Mandeville’s] important ideas” and that “The idea that   
 
The worst of all the multitude 
Did something for the common good 
was but the seed from which his later thought sprang” 45 
 
For Hayek “[Mandeville’s] main original thesis emerges only gradually and 
indirectly, as it were a by-product of defending his initial paradox that what are 
private vices are often public benefits” >Hayek 1978: 252move to footnote@. That 
gradual process had begun with The Grumbling Hive and, after the important 
landmarks constituted by the first and second editions of The Fable of the Bees, 
culminated in the 1729 publication of the Second Part. 
The paradox itself would not then have been immensely original. Hayek 
expressly says so. The most important Mandevillian innovation, according to him, 
resides in the theoretical developments concerning the spontaneous ordering of 
complex social institutions it gave rise to. Explaining the evolutionary processes by 
which language and the laws were formed from the time of the origins of society is 
                                                 
45 Hayek, New Essays, 251. 
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Mandeville’s remarkable feat. The fact that his highly imaginative and plausible 
hypotheses and theories are, as we have already hinted, made out of a single principle 
seems even more admirable. 
Hayek’s interpretation of Mandeville highlights two important aspects of his 
thought: the enormous development it shows from the first to the last text of the 
author and the circumstance that the bulk of the original contribution by him to the 
posterity of the social sciences lies in the exploration that essentially takes part along 
the six dialogues of the second part of The Fable of the Bees. Yet the most innovative 
feature of Hayek’s rereading of Mandeville consists in shifting the emphasis from the 
famous paradox to an explanation of the formation of complex social institutions 
through a naturalistic evolutionary process. We can observe, however, in both these 
notions (the paradox, and the process) an unchanging element that somehow binds 
them together: the use for theoretical purposes of the consideration in a more or less 
large scale of a mechanism involving perverse effects. 
A striking example of the use Mandeville makes of that mechanism is a 
passage of the Fourth Dialogue of the Second Book of The Fable of the Bees, where 
Cleomenes, the character the Author mainly speaks through, presents an analogy 
between the long sought after perfect happiness and the philosopher’s stone that leads 
him to the observation of curious and precious side-effects of the pursuit of some 
unsuccessful searches:  
 
It is with complete Felicity in this World, as it is with the 
Philosopher’s Stone: Both have been sought after many different 
Ways, by Wise Men as well as Fools, Tho’ neither of them has been 
obtain’d hitherto: But in searching after either, diligent Enquirers 
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have often stumbled by Chance on useful Discoveries of Things 
they did not look for, and which human Sagacity laboring with 
Design a priori never would have detected.46 
 
Readers of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism may easily recall a 
somewhat similar story told by Sextus about Apelles. The famous painter was looking 
for a special effect, a naturalistic depiction of foam in a horse’s mouth. After having 
for some time tried in vain to produce it, he quitted renouncing to attain his aim. In 
despair he threw his sponge at the painting.  
That story is crucial to the Pyrrhonians. By an analogy with it Sextus 
explained the purpose or end of their philosophy, for they claimed suspension of 
judgment (epoche) was first attained in a similar way – only after having expressly 
renounced the attainment of their aim, they eventually attained it in fact through the 
suspension of judgment. 
“So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a 
decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being 
unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by 
chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance.” 47 
This may stand as a metaphor for Mandeville’s understanding of society and 
politics as well. 
                                                 
46 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, II:179@. 
47 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, tr. R. G. Bury, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976), 21. 
